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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-4955
________________
ALFONSO GREEN WIGGINS,
Appellant
v.
HEINZ NORTH AMERICA.; WILLIAM H. MCNEECE, Plant Manager; UNITED
FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION LOCAL #56; ANTHONY R.
CINAGLIA, President; JACK SWIFT, Business Representative
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-06048)
District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 1, 2007
BEFORE: FISHER, ALDISERT and WEIS, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: June 5, 2007 )
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Alfonso Green Wiggins, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey granting motions for summary judgment
2filed by Appellees, United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local #56 (“Local
56”), Heinz North America (“Heinz”), and Heinz plant manager William McNeece, and
denying Wiggins’ cross-motion for summary judgment.  For the following reasons, we
will affirm.
Wiggins was a member of Local 56 during his employment on the third sanitation
shift at Heinz’s plant in Pennsauken, New Jersey.  After consulting with officials from
Local 56, Heinz decided to discontinue the third shift.  Heinz held a meeting informing
Wiggins and other members of the third shift of this decision and notifying them of their
severance options under the collective bargaining agreement between Heinz and Local
56.  The company also advised the affected employees to contact the company’s human
resources department if they wished to apply for a position in the first sanitation shift. 
Wiggins declined to do so, and thus his employment with Heinz terminated.  
Wiggins filed a grievance with Local 56 challenging Heinz’s decision to eliminate
the third shift.  Local 56 rejected the grievance as untimely.  Shortly thereafter, Wiggins
filed a complaint in the District Court alleging that Heinz’s decision to discontinue third
shift sanitation operations violated the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and
that Local 56 breached its duty of fair representation by secretly agreeing with Heinz to
eliminate union jobs.  The District Court construed the complaint as asserting two federal
claims: (1) against Heinz under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 185; and (2) against Local 56 for violating the duty of fair representation implied
3under the National Labor Relations Act.  The District Court granted the motions for
summary judgment filed by Local 56, Heinz, and McNeece, and denied Wiggins’ cross-
motion for summary judgment.  The District Court also dismissed the complaint as
against defendants Anthony Cinaglia and Jack Swift because those parties were not
properly served.  Wiggins now appeals.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a
District Court’s grant or denial of summary judgment.  See Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d
152, 157 (3d Cir. 2002).  Our task is to determine whether the record, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See
FED. R. CIV. P. 56©; Natale v. Camden County Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 580 (3d Cir.
2003).  A party opposing summary judgment must rest upon more than the allegations
raised in the pleadings to create a genuine issue of material fact.  See Hugh v. Butler
County Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005).
We agree with the District Court that Wiggins’ claims are barred because he did
not exhaust the dispute resolution procedures stipulated in the collective bargaining
agreement.  See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184-85 (1967); Bullock v. Dressel, 435 F.3d
294, 299 (3d Cir. 2006).  Wiggins did not exhaust his claim against Heinz because his
grievance challenging the company’s decision to eliminate the third shift was not timely
filed under the collective bargaining agreement.  See Carr v. Pacific Maritime Ass’n, 904
4F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650,
652 (1965)).  Article XXIII of the collective bargaining agreement between Heinz and
Local 56 states that union employees must submit grievances no later than seventy-two
hours after the challenged event.  Wiggins did not comply with this requirement, as he
waited more than one month after learning of Heinz’s decision to eliminate the shift
before filing a grievance challenging this decision.  Furthermore, Wiggins has not shown
sufficient grounds for excusing his failure to exhaust his claim against Heinz.  See Vaca,
386 U.S. at 185-86 (noting exceptions to exhaustion requirement).  Wiggins attempts to
excuse his untimely filing by noting that he made several unsuccessful attempts to contact
the union representative immediately after learning of Heinz’s decision to eliminate the
shift.  However, it is unclear why Wiggins chose to pursue this course of action instead of
filing a grievance with his immediate supervisor at the Heinz plant in accordance with the
procedures outlined in Article XXIII of the collective bargaining agreement.  In addition,
Wiggins has not submitted any evidence in support of his assertion that he made repeated
attempts to contact the union representative prior to filing the untimely grievance.  
Wiggins’ claim against Local 56 is also unexhausted because he never filed a
grievance accusing union officials of colluding with Heinz to eliminate union jobs.  To
the extent that Wiggins argues he should be excused from exhausting his claim against
Local 56 because the union cannot be trusted to fairly process this grievance, we reject
this argument because such an allegation is not supported by anything in the record. 
      Wiggins also cites to Article XXXIII of the collective bargaining agreement, which1
details Heinz’s obligation to provide severance to laid off workers.  The relevance of this
section to the instant suit is unclear because it is undisputed that Heinz offered severance
to the employees who were laid off as a result of the company’s decision to end the third
sanitation shift.
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There is no indication that Wiggins even attempted to submit a grievance regarding the
alleged misconduct by union officials.
Even if the claims were not defaulted, we agree with the District Court that
Wiggins would not be able to prevail on their merits.  Wiggins has not shown that Heinz’s
decision to end the third sanitation shift violated the collective bargaining agreement. 
Article III of the agreement vested management with authority to lay off employees,
subject to the limitations provided in other sections of the agreement.  The only apparent
argument advanced by Wiggins is that Heinz’s decision to lay off union employees on the
third sanitation shift and replace them with non-union employees violated the non-
discrimination provision located in Article IV of the collective bargaining agreement.  In
this provision, Heinz and Local 56 agree “that there shall be no discrimination in
violation of any state, federal or local law.”  We reject Wiggins’ claim that Heinz violated
Article IV because he has not cited to any authority showing that the company’s alleged
favoritism of non-union workers amounted to illegal discrimination.  Moreover, as noted
by the District Court, nothing in the record supports Wiggins’ claim that Heinz eventually
restaffed the third sanitation shift with non-union workers.  1
We also agree with the District Court’s analysis of Wiggins’ claim that Local 56
denied him fair representation.  To demonstrate that Local 56 breached its duty of fair
representation, Wiggins must show that the union’s conduct toward him was arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith.  See Riley v. Letter Carriers Local No. 380, 668 F.2d 224,
228 (3d Cir. 1981).  The record contains only unsupported allegations that representatives
from Local 56 colluded with Heinz to eliminate union jobs.  The District Court correctly
determined that these statements, standing alone, are insufficient to withstand the motions
for summary judgment.  See Masy v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 790 F.2d
322, 328 (3d Cir. 1986).
Finally, we reject the claims of procedural error that Wiggins asserts on appeal. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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